The 1909 Copyright Act in International Context by Gervais, Daniel
Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 26 | Issue 2 Article 1
2010
The 1909 Copyright Act in International Context
Daniel Gervais
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Daniel Gervais, The 1909 Copyright Act in International Context, 26 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 185 (2009).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol26/iss2/1
CONFERENCE ON THE 100TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE 1909 COPYRIGHT ACT




The passage of the 1909 U.S. Copyright Act was embedded in a
significant period of evolution for international copyright law. Just a
year before, the Berne Convention had been revised for the second
time. This Berlin (1908) Act of the Convention in remembered in par-
ticular for the introduction of a broad prohibition against formalities
concerning the "exercise and enjoyment" of copyright. 1909 was also
just one year before a new copyright bill was brought before the Brit-
ish Parliament. This Copyright Act, finally adopted in December
1911 and which entered into force in July 1, 1912, greatly influenced
laws in many countries, including Australia, Canada, Israel, New
Zealand, Nigeria, and South Africa.
In this Essay, I situate the Berlin Act within the framework of the
evolution of the Berne Convention from 1886 until the current 1971
Act and explore the role played by the United States, not as much as a
participant in the Berlin Conference but by the way its actions influ-
enced the actions of others. To this end, I discuss sequentially the
emergence and evolution of the Berne Convention, and then two
areas worthy of deeper analyses when considered against the back-
drop of the 1909 Act, namely the prohibition against formalities and
the rule imposing retroactive application of the Convention.
INTRODUCTION
As other Articles in this issue of the Santa Clara & High Tech-
nology Law Journal demonstrate, 1909 was a momentous year for
t Professor of Law, Co-Director, Technology and Entertainment Law Program, Van-
derbilt University Law School. Many thanks to the participants in the Conference on the 100th
Anniversary of the 1909 Act held at Santa Clara University for their helpful comments.
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copyright in the United States. The passage of the 1909 Copyright Act
was also embedded in a significant period of evolution for interna-
tional copyright law. Just a year before, the Berne Convention had
been revised for the second time.' The Berlin (1908) Act of the Berne
Convention was important for many reasons: it introduced rules con-
cerning the adaptation of copyrighted works, the protection of "cine-
matographic works;" a minimum term of protection of 50 years post
mortem auctoris; rules concerning the "mechanical reproduction" of
musical works; and the current text of the provision on retroactive ap-
plication of the Convention to works existing at the time of its entry
into force for countries acceding to the Convention.2 It is also at the
Berlin Conference that the current broad prohibition against formali-
ties concerning the "exercise and enjoyment" of the rights protected
by the Convention, which is mentioned in a number of Articles in this
issue, was adopted.
1909 was also just one year before a new copyright bill was
brought before the British Parliament. This Copyright Act, finally
adopted in December 1911 and which entered into force in July 1,
1912, greatly influenced laws in many countries, including Australia,
Canada, Israel, New Zealand, Nigeria, and South Africa. 4 It also con-
solidated a "glorious muddle" of no less than 22 different British sta-
tutes passed between 1735 and 1906 and provided a more "intelligible
and systematic" structure that survives to this day.
In this Essay, I want to situate the Berlin Act within the frame-
work of the evolution of the Berne Convention from 1886 until the
1. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886,
126 A.T.S. 1901 [hereinafter Berne Convention (1886)]; revised July 24, 1971, amended Sept.
29, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 [hereinafter Berne Convention (1971)]. The original 1886
text was revised at Paris in 1896 and then in Berlin in 1908 [hereinafter Berne Convention
(1908)]. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR
THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS FROM 1886 TO 1986, 19-20, (1986) [he-
reinafter CENTENARY].
2. See CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 144-159. The provision on retroactivity is being
challenged in a case currently before the 10' Circuit. See Golan v. Holder, 611 F.Supp 2d 1165
(D.Colo. 2009).
3. Berne Convention (1908), art. 4(2). See CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 229; See also
Sam Ricketson, The Boundaries of Copyrights: Its Proper Limitations and Exceptions: Interna-
tional Conventions and Treaties, 3 INTELL. PROP. Q. 56-94 (1999).
4. Copyright Act 1911, I & 2 Geo. 5, c. 46 (Eng.). However, this cut both ways. A
number of provisions in the 1911 Act were taken from the laws of the self-governing colonies
and dominions. See BRAD SHERMAN & LIONEL BENTLY, THE MAKING OF MODERN
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE, 1760-1911, at 112 & 136-7 (1999).
5. See BENTLY & SHERMAN, supra note 4, at 128. The "glorious muddle" metaphor is
attributed to Lord Monkswell. See id. at 135.
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current 1971 Act and explore the role played by the United States, not
as much as a participant in the Berlin Conference but by the way its
actions influenced the actions of others.6 To this end, I will discuss,
first, the emergence and evolution of the Berne Convention in Part I.
Looking at the accomplishments of the Berlin Revision Conference, I
then selected two areas worthy of deeper analyses, notably because of
their relevance in understanding the differences between the 1909 and
1976 Copyright Acts. In Part II, I thus consider the prohibition against
formalities. In Part III, I discuss the rule imposing retroactive applica-
tion of the Convention. I should note that I could have selected the
term of protection, and the linkage between that term and the life of
the author instead of a fixed term from the date of creation or publica-
tion, but the issue is rather well known in the wake of the Eldred case;
it is also discussed by other contributors to this issue.7
I.THE EVOLUTION OF THE BERNE CONVENTION (1886-1971)
A. The Emergence of 1886 Text of the Berne Convention
The seed of the Berne Convention was sown by the Association
littiraire internationale (ALI), the predecessor of the present-day As-
sociation litt&aire et artistique internationale (ALAI). 8 Its first presi-
dent was the famous French author and human rights campaigner Vic-
tor Hugo, perhaps the best known advocate for the Romantic
Movement so closely associated with the natural rights foundation of
authors' rights. Romantics saw creative works as extensions of their
authors.9 But they also believed in the power of individuals to influ-
ence and shape events-Victor Hugo wrote that "literature was the
government of humankind by the human spirit."10 More importantly
6. The administrative provisions of the Convention were revised in 1979 but the latest
substantive changes to the Convention were made at the Paris Revision Conference of 1971. See
CENTENARY, supra note I at 23, 52.
7. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). See also Paul Bender, Copyright And
The First Amendment After Eldred V. Ashcroft, 30 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 349 (2007); William F.
Patty, Fair Use and Statutory Reform in the Wake ofEldred, 92 Cal. L. Rev. 1639 (2004).
8. See Association littgraire et artistique internationale, http:// www.alai.org (last vi-
sited November 4, 2009). The International Literary Association, established at the 1878 Con-
gress (organized by the Socite des gens de lettres) and now known as the International Literary
and Artistic Association (ALAI), was the original proponent of the Berne Convention. See
RICHARD R. BOWKER, COPYRIGHT: ITS HISTORY AND ITS LAW 314 (1914); CENTENARY, supra
note 1, at 19; concerning the Association's name change, see CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 144.
9. See Association littdraire et artistique internationale, http://www.alai.org (last visited
November 4, 2009).
10. Victor Hugo, Discours d'ouverture du Congrs littiraire international de 1878
(1878).
187
188 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. [Vol. 26
perhaps, during his keynote address to the Congress at which ALI was
created, Hugo noted that while a book belongs to its author, ideas ex-
pressed in the book belong to humankind." Moreover, if one must
choose between the rights of the writer or the rights of the "human
spirit," then the rights of the writer must be "sacrificed" because the
public interest is the sole preoccupation and must come before every-
thing else.12 He added that literary property should be "founded" (es-
tablished) in parallel to the public domain.'3 Hugo's explicit exclusion
of ideas from the scope of copyright protection is a well established
notion in both major (Western) legal systems, and in the TRIPS
Agreement.14 Two examples should suffice. First, § 102(b) of the US
Copyright Act15 excludes from the scope of protection ideas, proce-
dures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, principles,
and discoveries. Second, French treatises on copyright (literary and
artistic property, that is) typically mention that "les iddes sont de libre
parcours" (ideas should circulate freely) is a fundamental principle of
intellectual property protection.16
Hugo's contention that, should a conflict arise between the rights
of the author and those of "the human spirit," the latter should prevail,
also seems compatible with prescriptive lessons drawn from utilita-
rian analyses according to which copyright protection should stop
once the goal of maximizing welfare-by ensuring that new works
are created without stifling the potential for new ones (i.e., should go
no further than is required to "promote the progress of science and
11. Id.
12. Id. This is a rather loose translation. The original speech is as follows:
Le livre, comme livre, appartient A l'auteur, mais comme pens6e, il appartient - le
mot n'est pas trop vaste - au genre humain. Toutes les intelligences y ont droit. Si
l'un des deux droits, le droit de l'6crivain et le droit de l'esprit humain, devait
tre sacrifi6, ce serait, certes, le droit de l'6crivain, car l'int6rt public est notre
preoccupation unique, et tous, je le d6clare, doivent passer avant
nous... Constatons la propri6t6 litt6raire, mais, en m~me temps, fondons le do-
maine public.
13. See id.
14. Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art 9.2, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade organization, Annex IC, 1869
U.N.T.S 299; 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS].
15. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
16. See, e.g. ANDRt AND HENRI-JACQUES LUCAS, TRAITE DE PROPRIETE LITTERAIRE ET
ARTISTIQUE, % 28 and 58 (3d ed. 2006). As the authors explain: "C'est un principe fondamental
du droit de la propri6t6 intellectuelle que les id6es sont en elles-memes de libre parcours. La
r~gle a 6 pr6sent~e comme une concession A l'int~rat de la socit6." Id. at 28. This may be
translated as follows: It is a fundamental principle of intellectual property that ideas are free to
use. This rule may be presented as a concession to societal interests.
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useful arts"l 7)-or indeed economic analyses of copyright that look
for a (measurable) optimal protection point at which creation and dis-
semination of new works is not negated by deadweight and other wel-
fare losses.18 Hugo's understanding of what was to become the Berne
Convention not only incorporated an element of public interest as part
of the framework; public interest was and is the Convention's frame-
work.19
The 1886 text of the Convention arguably met this objective. Its
substantive content was minimalist. Its basic premise was to ensure
that authors who were nationals of countries that would accede to the
new treaty and thus form the "Berne Union" would be protected in all
countries of the Union without discrimination according to the well-
known principle of national treatment. 2 0 Otherwise, the original Con-
vention only contained a few rights: translation, 21 and public repre-
sentation for dramatic and dramatico-musical works.22
The original text also implicitly included a limited right of re-
production.23 It referred to "infringing copies," which were "liable to
seizure on importation." 24 It also contained an explicit, though condi-
tional right of reproduction for newspapers or periodicals, which ap-
plied only if specifically asserted by the author.25 More importantly,
the 1886 text contained a partial definition of "unlawful reproductions
to which this Convention applies," which, interestingly, included "un-
authorized indirect appropriations of a literary or artistic work, of var-
ious kinds, such as adaptations, musical arrangements, etc., when they
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER AND WILLIAM M. LANDES, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 233-241 (2003) (Where the authors discuss the
optimal duration of copyright protection). Id. at 415 (They also note the "danger that the [intel-
lectual property] system would be extended beyond the optimal point, implying the existence of
such a point.").
19. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
20. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 119. The Berne "Union" is composed of all countries
that are party to the Convention. See Berne Convention (1971), supra art. I The term "unionist"
is used to refer to those countries.
21. Berne Convention (1886), supra note 1, at arts., 5, 6, 9(2). See CENTENARY, supra
note 1, at 228. The term of protection was ten years.
22. Id. at arts. 5-6. The term of protection was ten years.
23. The most fundamental right, the right of reproduction, was mostly taken for granted
as it were, because it only made it in the Stockholm Convention Revision (Act) of 1967.
CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 232-234. It is also at the 1967 Revision Conference that the three-
step test, to which I return below, made it into the Convention. It had existed in national laws for
decades before that, starting with the Statute ofAnne of 1710 (8 Anne c. 19 (Eng.)).
24. Berne Convention (1886), supra note 1, at art. 12(1). See CENTENARY, supra note 1,
at 228.
25. Berne Convention (1886), supra note 1, at art. 7.
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are only the reproduction of a particular work, in the same form, or in
another form, without essential alterations, additions, or abridge-
ments, so as not to present the character of a new original work"26
One of the ways in which copyright law must be substantially revi-
sited to reestablish a proper balance is the scope of the right of adap-
tation (or the right to make "derivative works").2 7
In other words, apart from a few basic rights, the most important
set of provisions of the 1886 text of the Berne Convention dealt with
national treatment. 2 8 The Convention also contained exceptions, in-
cluding one for the reproduction of "articles of political discussion,
news of the day or miscellaneous facts", which could not be prohi-
bited, 29 and one for "use in publication for teaching or scientific pur-
poses, or for chrestomathies." 30 Those exceptions, including the only
mandatory one contained in the Convention (news of the day, facts
and "articles of political discussion'), undeniably reflected public in-
terest considerations, particularly freedom of information and the
press. In a precursor to debates about the manufacture of tools to cir-
cumvent Technical Protection Measures (TPMs), a Protocol to the
1886 text also provided that the manufacture and sale of "instruments
for the mechanical reproduction of musical works in which copyright
subsists shall not be considered as constituting an infringement of
musical copyright."3'
B.Berlin and the Addition ofNew Rights
New minimum rights were added at successive Revision Confe-
rences, starting in Berlin in 1908, partly to mirror the pattern of evolu-
tion of forms of exploitation of copyright works invented after 1886.32
A few exceptions were also added but the area of exceptions and limi-
tations in the Convention was mostly left to each country and were
considered as unregulated space at the international level.
26. Id. at art. 10 (emphasis added).
27. In United States copyright law, see 17 U.S.C. §106(2); See also R. Anthony Reese,
Transfornativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 467 (2008).
28. Berne Convention (1886), supra note 1, at art. 2.
29. Id. at art.7(2). See also CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 228.
30. Berne Convention (1886), supra note 1, at art. 8. This exception only allowed coun-
tries to maintain existing exceptions.
31. Berne Convention (1886), supra note 1, Final Protocol of September 9, 1886, art. 3,
reprinted in CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 228.
32. See CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 19-23.
33. Except for the imposition in the TRIPS Agreement of a three-step test used to filter
individual exceptions. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14 at art. 13. The test was added to the
Berne Convention (art. 9(2)), where it only applies to the right of reproduction, in 1967. See P.
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The Berlin Conference discussed proposals prepared by the host
(German) government.34 A key role was reserved, however, for the
French government, which saw France as a parent of the Convention
owing to the role played by Hugo and Paris-based ALAI; the main
Committee Chairman and rapporteur was French law professor Louis
Renault.3 5
The first paragraphs of the Report of the Conference recall the
role of ALAI in preparing the "arduous" Berne Conference.36 It notes
that "real progress" must be made by unanimous agreement among
member States of the Berne Union on "delicate problems" with the
aim of determining to what extent one should enact "an international
rule which is superimposed on the various national laws, and to what
extent it is essential to confine ourselves to referring matters back to
them."3 7 In a similar vein, it mentions that "agreement implies sacri-
fices" and the result would thus not "to everyone's complete satisfac-
tion."3 8 While such observations may seem to state rather obvious
facts, their inclusion in the report intimates that, although most partic-
ipants at the Conference were mostly "like-minded" about authors'
rights, there were still very significant disagreements.39
BERNT HUGENHOLTZ AND RUTH OKEDUIl, CONCEIVING AN INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENT ON
LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS TO COPYRIGHT: FINAL REPORT 3 (2008),
http://www.iprsonline.org/resources/IntLE HugenholtzOkediji.pdf (noting that "despite over a
century of international norm setting in the field of copyright, L&E's have largely remained
"unregulated space."). On the three-step test, see MARTIN SENFrLEBEN, COPYRIGHT
LIMITATIONS AND THE THREE-STEP TEST 283-293 (Kluwer Law International 2004); and D.
Gervais, Towards A New Core International Copyright Nonn: The Reverse Three-Step Test, 9
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1, 1-37 (2005).
34. See CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 144. It was standard practice at each such confer-
ence to let the host government present proposals. Usually, consultations with a number of other
major stakeholders and governments preceded the conference itself. Conferences also met in
"sessions" and often tasked committees to prepare reports on specific issues. At Berlin, a special
report on mechanical reproduction of music was prepared.
35. See id. at 161. Mr. Renault had participated in the Berne Conference as a key member
of the French delegation and had been the Head of the French delegation at the 1896 Conference
held in Paris. See id. at 126,143. He won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1907. Nobelprize.org, Bio-
graphy of Louis Renault, http://nobelprize.org/nobel-prizes/peace/laureates/1907/renault-
bio.html (last visited November 4, 2009).
36. See CENTENARY, supra note I at 144.
37. Id. The unanimous consent rule is still in effect. See Berne Convention (1971), supra
note 1, at art. 27(3). This probably explains why there will most likely never be another revision
(getting the current membership-164 countries as of November 1, 2009 (see www.wipo.int)) to
agree on anything might prove impossible).
38. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 145.
39. Countries participating in the Conference included the fifteen that had signed the ex-
tant text (Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain, Haiti, Italy, Japan, Luxemburg,
Monaco, Norway, Spain and Sweden, Switzerland and Tunisia) but also a number of countries
that had not at the time adhered to the Convention--most of which did so after the Berlin Confe-
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The Report notes the broad participation by "non-Unionist"
countries and that the "great interest" of the Netherlands, Russia and
the United States was especially appreciated.40 The U.S. delegate in-
dicated the "sympathy" of his government "for the goal pursued in
general by the Berne Union" and testified to his own "personal inter-
est and admiration" for the work of the Union.41 The careful language
(e.g., "in general and "personal interest") made it clear that the United
States was not prepared to join, and this had been made clear in in-
formal discussions held before the Conference.42
The main accomplishments of the Berlin Conference have al-
ready been mentioned. 4 3 Two of them of particular interest in connec-
tion with the 1909 Copyright Act, namely the prohibition against
formalities and the rule concerning retroactive application, are dis-
cussed below.4 4 Other noteworthy results emerged, however. One
could mention in that respect (a) a broader translation right; (b) the
removal of the requirement that an author assert her rights in serial
novels and short stories; (c) a new right of adaptation for mechanical
reproduction and public performance; (d) the right to obtain seizure of
illegal adaptations; and (e) a right of reproduction and public perfor-
mance by cinematography.4 5
On the other side of the norm ledger, Article 13 of the Berlin Act
allowed countries to make reservations and impose conditions on the
(then new) mechanical reproduction right.46 In words that resonate
still today, the Report notes that Berne Union members should "not
consider only one side of the problem and adopt too rigid a stance."4 7
To implement flexible norms, a number of delegates preferred to
leave the exercise of the right to market mechanisms.4 8 However, the
rence: Argentina, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, Greece, Guatemala, Liberia, Mexico, The
Netherlands, Persia, Peru, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Siam (Thailand) , Uruguay and Venezu-
ela. After some diplomatic wrangling, the United States attended, even though it had indicated it
was not prepared to adhere, and was represented by Thorvad Solberg, the Head of the Copyright
Department at the Library of Congress (previous title of the Register of Copyrights). See
BOWKER, supra note 8, at 323-4; See also CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 145.
40. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 145. See also note 20 supra and accompanying text.
41. Id.
42. See id.; see also BOWKER, note 8 supra, at 324-5;
43. See generally CENTENARY, supra note 1; see also supra text accompanying note 2.
44. See infra Parts II and III, respectively.
45. Beme Convention (1908), supra note 1, at arts. 8, 13 and 14. Not mentioned here are
(a) definitional changes (what is "published" etc.), and (b) administrative provisions.
46. Id. at art. 13(2).
47. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 155.
48. See generally id. at 156. "Why should phonograph manufacturers not do the same as
publishers and negotiate with the composers." Id.
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German government was "seeking to safeguard the interests of small
manufacturers by protecting them both against the too heavy costs
they could face as a result of excessive estimates on the part of the au-
thors and publishers and against the danger of establishment of mo-
nopolies in favor of some manufacturers with large amounts of capital
at their disposal."49
The Conference discussed whether copies manufactured under a
compulsory license could be exported. A complete ban on the impor-
tation of copies from any country where a compulsory license was in
place was considered and the "idea" of such a ban was "accepted
without difficulty" but was considered "too absolute."50 The drafters
chose instead to add the words "all such reservations and conditions
shall apply only in the countries which have imposed them" to Article
13(2).5
II.THE PROHIBITION AGAINST FORMALITIES
A. The United States and the Early Acts of the Berne Conven-
tion
It is well known that the United States "finally" joined the Berne
family in 1989, 103 years after the initial text of the Convention was
adopted in Berne.52 Prior to this, the Berne Union members were
49. Id. (explaining German law already had a compulsory license system in place at the
time). As we know, the music industry is now concentrated in the hands of four major compa-
nies (Sony Music Entertainment, Universal Music Group, Warner Music Group and EMI). In
2005, the "big four" accounted for 72% of worldwide sales. See IFPI, IFPI releases definitive
statistics on global market for recorded music (Aug. 2, 2005),
http://www.ifpi.org/content/sectionnews/20050802.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2009).
50. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 156.
51. Berne Convention (1908), supra note 1, at art. 13(2).
52. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat.
2853. There is a vast amount of commentary on adherence by the U.S., including in this volume.
See, e. g., Irwin Karp, Final Report, Berne Article 18 Study on Retroactive United States Copy-
right Protection For Berne and Other Works, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 157 (1996); Wil-
liam Patry, The United States and International Copyright Law: From Berne to Eldred 40
Hous. L. REV. 749 (2003); Susan Stanton, Development of the Berne International Copyright
Convention and Implications of United States Adherence, 13 Hous. J. INT'L L. 149 (1990); Na-
talie C. Suhl, Moral Rights Protection in the United States under the Berne Convention: A Fic-
tional Work? 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1203 (2002); Laura E. Steinfeld,
The Berne Convention and Protection of Works of Architecture: Why the United States Should
Create a New Subject Matter Category for Works of Architecture Under Section 102(A) of the
Copyright Act of 1976, 24 IND. L. REv. 459 (1991); Ralph Oman, The United States and the
Berne Union: An Extended Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 71 (1988); Orrin G. Hatch, Better Late
Than Never: Implementation ofthe 1886 Berne Convention, 22 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 171 (1989);
Dennis S. Karjala, United States Adherence to the Berne Convention and Copyright Protection
ofInformation-Based Technologies 28 JURIMETRICS J. 147 (1988).
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keenly aware of the absence of the United States from the Conven-
tion.
Works first published abroad, including in the United Kingdom,
could be reproduced in the United States without authorization. In
fact, the 1790 Copyright Act limited protection to works published in
America by citizens or residents of the United States.5 4 Apparently,
this situation was not entirely beneficial to United States authors be-
cause foreign works could be reproduced more cheaply.55 Moreover,
this absence of protection for foreign works in the United States also
meant that United States authors could not be protected elsewhere. 5 6
Supporting evidence may be found in the bills that authors and
publishers who favored protection of foreign works were able to get
introduced in Congress almost every year from 1837 until 1890.17
However, it was only in 1891 that limited protection of foreign au-
thors was implemented, by the Chace Act. 8 That Act provided that a
work was protected if it had been printed from type set within the
United States and two copies of the American imprint were deposited
in the Copyright Office on or before the date of first publication any-
where else. 59 The first requirement came to be known as the "manu-
facturing clause," and it would only be phased out in the 1980s.60
53. See supra notes 41, 42 and accompanying text.
54. Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124, 125 (1790); see also WILLIAM BRIGGS, THE
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT 637 (1906).
55. See BRIGGS, supra note 54, at 637-638.
56. Mark Twain was routinely published (without consent or payment) in Canada, for
example. At one point, he moved to Montreal to establish residency there and protect his copy-
rights. See Restoring The Balance: Panel on Contracting and Bargaining, 28 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 419, 423 (2005) (comment by Nick Taylor, President, Author's Guild); see also Oversight
on International Copyrights: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trade-
marks of the Comm. of the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 42 (1984) (report of the U.S. Copyright Of-
fice).
57. See Robert Spoo, Ezra Pound's Copyright Statute: Perpetual Rights And The Prob-
lem OfHeirs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1775, 1785 (2009) (noting that "[iun response to a petition pre-
sented by British authors, Senator Henry Clay introduced a bill in Congress in 1837 that would
have recognized British copyrights in the United States. The bill encountered strong opposition
from the American book trade and never became law.... A series of Anglo-American copyright
bills introduced in Congress between 1886 and 1890 met with the same fate. One historian has
observed, 'The publishers of cheap reprint series were against [such legislation], and so too were
the increasingly powerful trade unions in the printing industry who feared loss of work if the
copyright in imported books were protected under American law."') (notes omitted).
58. See Chace International Copyright Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 565, 26 Stat. 1106, 1107
(1891) [hereinafter Chace Act]; see also BOWKER, supra note 8, at 346-370; see also Spoo, su-
pra note 58, at 1785-87.
59. See generally Chace Act, supra note 59, at 1107.
60. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT'S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE
CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 152 (Stanford Univ. Press 2003) (1994).
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The Chace Act was based on the principle of reciprocity.61 A
Proclamation issued by President Harrison on July 1, 1989 allowed
citizens of Belgium, France, Great Britain and Switzerland access to
the formalities leading to protection of their works in the United
States, subject to the manufacturing clause. 62
The manufacturing clause was relaxed in the 1909 Act, which
granted automatic protection to foreign-language works of foreign
origin by exempting them from the manufacturing requirements and
lowered the manufacturing requirements for foreign works in English
by providing copyright for 30 days if a copy of the foreign edition
was deposited in the U.S. Copyright Office within 30 days of its pub-
lication elsewhere. Once a copy was deposited, however, the work
then had to be reprinted on U.S. soil within the thirty-day window. 4
The perceived burden of complying with formalities, which
would not have been obvious for local foreign authors and publishers,
and the strict application of the manufacturing clause, may have been
in the minds of the Beme negotiators in Berlin, which resulted in the
adoption of the broad ban on formalities. The Berne Union members
went a step further in their condemnation of "piracy" in the United
States by adopting a Protocol to the Beme Convention in 1914.66 Pro-
posed by the United Kingdom, it was designed as retaliation for the
manufacturing clause and allowed Berne members not to protect of
61. See Chace Act, supra note 59, at 26 Stat. 1110 ("[T]his act shall only apply to a citi-
zen or subject of a foreign state when such foreign state or nation permits to citizens of the Unit-
ed States of America the benefit of copyright on substantially the same basis as its own citizens .
62. See BRIGGS, supra note 55, at 645. Further proclamations issues extended the same
privileges to citizens of many other nations. See also S. LADAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY 837-38 (The MacMillan Company 1938);
see also Binyomin Kaplan, Determining Ownership of Foreign Copyright: A Three-Tier Pro-
posal, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 2045, 2051 (2000).
63. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075, 1078-80 (1909). The exemption for for-
eign language works was introduced by an Act of March 3, 1905. Act of March 3, ch 1432, 33
Stat. 1000, 1000 (1905).
64. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, supra note 64, at 1079.
65. The Acts of the Berlin Conference do not mention the United States (or formalities in
any other country by name for that matter) but most of the examples mentioned during the de-
bates point to the U.S. For example, the Records state: "it is recalled that there was a time not so
long ago when, to guarantee a work protection in a foreign country . . .. [I]t was necessary to
register and often even to deposit that work in the foreign country within a certain time limit."
CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 148. As to the difficulty for "non-sophisticated" authors and pub-
lishers in complying with the U.S. formalities, see CATHERINE SEVILLE, THE
INTERNATIONALISATION OF COPYRIGHT LAW: BOOKS, BUCCANEERS AND THE BLACK FLAG IN
THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 248 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006).
66. See CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 20.
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U.S. works even if first published in their territory.
The 1909 Act was thus a "step forward" for foreign authors. Af-
ter all, it was signed into law by a member of the Authors Club (Pres-
ident Roosevelt). 6 8 Yet, the lawyer representing the American Copy-
right League (authors) noted that the "hopes of the friends of
copyright will not . .. be fully realized until the manufacturing clause,
with the affidavit provision, is repealed and the United States enabled
by Congress to join the family of civilized nations as a signatory pow-
er in the Berlin convention."6 9
B. The Emergence and Interpretation ofArticle 5(2)
1.The 1884-1886 text
Article 5(2) of the Berne Convention (1971), which contains the
prohibition against formalities, came into being in the very early days
of the Convention. In the first draft of the Convention, published in
1884,70 the relevant provision read as follows:
Authors who are nationals of one of the Contracting Countries
shall enjoy in all the other countries of the Union, in respect of
their works, whether in manuscript or unpublished form or pub-
lished in one of those countries, such advantages as the laws con-
cerned do now or will hereafter grant to nationals.
The enjoyment of the above rights shall be subject to compliance
with the conditions of form and substance prescribed by the legis-
lation of the country of origin of the work or, in the case of a
manuscript or unpublished work, by the legislation of the country
to which the author belongs.7 1
The basic intent was to grant to foreign authors the same rights as na-
tionals. This was confirmed by the Drafting Committee, which also
clarified the meaning of the expression "conditions of forms and sub-
67. Additional Protocol to the International Copyright Convention on Nov. 13, 1908,
signed at Berne, Mar. 20, 1914, 1 L.N.T.S. 243. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL
COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE 22 (2001). The Protocol entered into force on
April 20, 1915. See William Belanger, U.S. Compliance with the Berne Convention, 3 GEO.
MASON INDEPENDENT L. REv. 373, n3 (1995). The Protocol allowed Berne members to restrict
the protection given to "works of authors who are .... nationals of a . . . non-Union country,"
which "fails to protect in an adequate manner the works of authors who are nationals of one of
the countries of the Union." CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 229.
68. See BOWKER, supra note 8, at 371-2.
69. Id. at 372 (reference to the "Berlin convention" is to the Berlin Act of the Berne Con-
vention of course) (emphasis added).
70. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 94.
71. Id.
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stance," originally a German proposal, which was changed to "for-
malities and conditions."72 The Minutes of the First Conference held
in Berne in 1884 are very useful to illuminate the meaning of "for-
malities" and purpose of the prohibition, as can be seen from the fol-
lowing excerpt:
Dr. Meyer: "It is merely a question of noting that the wording pro-
posed by the German Delegation, 'conditions of form and sub-
stance' has been replaced by the words 'formalities and condi-
tions', and that the word 'formalities' being taken as a synonym of
the term 'conditions of form', included, for instance, registration,
deposit, etc. ; whereas the expression 'conditions' , being in our
view synonymous with 'conditions of substance', includes, for in-
stance, the completion of a translation within the prescribed period.
Thus the words 'formalities and conditions' cover all that has to be
observed for the author's rights in relation to his work to come into
being ('Voraussetzungen' in German), whereas the effects and
consequences of protection ('Wirkungen' in German), notably with
respect to the extent of protection have to remain subject to the
principle of treatment on the same footing as nationals. The Presi-
dent noted that the Conference agreed with Dr. Meyer on the scope
of the words 'formalities and conditions'. 7
2.The 1896 interpretation
The Report of 1896 Paris Conference, where the prohibition was
also discussed, contains a useful statement:
Under the text of the Convention, the enjoyment of copyright shall
be subject to the accomplishment of the conditions and formalities
prescribed by law in the country of origin of the work. The mean-
ing of this provision does not seem to be seriously debatable. As a
result of it, the author needs only to have complied with the legis-
lation of the country of origin, to have completed in that country
the conditions and formalities which may be required there. He
does not have to complete formalities in the other countries where
he wished to claim protection. This interpretation, which is in
keeping with the text, was certainly in the minds of the authors of
the 1886 Convention ... 74
3.The adoption of the current text at Berlin
The 1908 Berlin Conference adopted a different version of Arti-
72. Id.
73. Id. at 94-95.
74. Id. at 137 (emphasis in original).
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cle 2. It has survived until now." The relevant part reads as follows:
The enjoyment and the exercise of these rights shall not be subject
to any formality; such enjoyment and such exercise are independ-
ent of the existence of protection in the country of origin of the
work. Consequently, apart from the provisions of this Convention,
the extent of protection, as well as the means of redress afforded to
the author to protect his rights, shall be governed exclusively by
the laws of the country where protection is claimed. 76
To interpret that provision in context, as required under Article
31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties77 and general
principles of statutory construction, one must read it together with Ar-
ticle 5(1), which provides that:
Authors shall enjoy, in respect of works for which they are pro-
tected under this Convention, in countries of the Union other than
the country of origin, the rights which their respective laws do now
or may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights spe-
cially granted by this Convention.7
The expression "these rights" in Art. 5(2) clearly refers to the "the
rights which their respective laws do now or may hereafter grant to
their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by this Conven-
tion." 79 The Convention thus imposes (a) an obligation to grant na-
tional treatment, that is to treat foreign right holders no less favorably
than nationals, and (b) an obligation to provide the "rights specially
granted by the Convention."8 0
To understand the scope of the prohibition, the Report of the
1908 Berlin Conference is worth quoting in extenso. It begins with a
statement that the provision does not apply to domestic authors and
then explains the shift from the single formality requirement (in the
country of origin) to the no formality formulation existing in Conven-
tion text today:
75. Berne Convention (1971), supra note 1, at art. 5(2).
76. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 149.
77. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (stat-
ing "A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.")
78. Berne Convention (1971), supra note 1, at art. 5(1).
79. See MIHALY FICSOR, GUIDE TO THE COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS TREATIES
ADMINISTERED BY WIPO AND GLOSSARY OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED TERMS (2003), §BC-
5.6 [hereinafter MIHALY FIcSOR].
80. See id. at §§BC-5.1 and BC-5.2; see also D. Gervais, China-Measures Affecting the
Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights, 103: 3 AM. J. INT'L L. 549, 550
(2009).
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The legislation of the country in which the work is published and
in which it is nationalized by the very fact of publication continues
to be absolutely free to subject the existence or the exercise of the
right to protection in the country to whatever conditions and for-
malities it thinks fit; it is a pure question of domestic law. Outside
the country of publication, protection may be requested in the other
countries of the Union not only without having to complete any
formalities in them, but even without being obliged to justify that
the formalities in the country of origin have been accomplished.
This is what results, on the one hand, from a general principle
which is going to be stated and explained and, on the other, from
the deletion of the third paragraph of Article 11 of the 1886 Con-
vention. This Article [. . .] state[s], at the beginning of its para-
graph 2, that 'the enjoyment of these rights shall be subject to the
accomplishment of the conditions and formalities prescribed by
law in the country of origin of the work' and, to remove difficulties
which had arisen in certain countries, the Paris Interpretative Dec-
laration had emphasized this idea-which was evidently that of the
authors of the 1886 Convention-that the protection depends
solely on the accomplishment, in the country of origin, of the con-
ditions and formalities which may be required by the legislation of
that country. This was already a great simplification which will be
appreciated if it is recalled that there was a time not so long ago
when, to guarantee a work protection in a foreign country, even by
virtue of an international convention, it was necessary to register
and often even to deposit that work in the foreign country within a
certain time limit. The new Convention simplifies matters still fur-
ther since it requires no justification. Difficulties had arisen with
regard to the production of a certificate from the authority of the
country of origin-this production having been considered, occa-
sionally, as the preliminary to infringement action, which caused
delays. 81
Unquestionably, the major formalities considered prohibited un-
der art. 5(2) are registration with a governmental authority and de-
posit of a copy of the work, when they are linked to the existence of
copyright or its exercise, especially in enforcement proceedings. In-
deed, formal requirement in existence at the time essentially involved
registration, deposit (in national libraries) and, in rare cases, transla-
82tion in a national language within a predetermined period of time.
For many reasons, while it was necessary to respect each country's
ability to impose such requirements, they had to be decoupled from
81. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 148.
82. See id.
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copyright. Deposit is still required for published works in many coun-
tries, but the sanction for failure to provide free copies to a national
library cannot be the removal of copyright. 84
"Enjoyment" refers to the very existence of the right while "ex-
ercise" refers in particular to enforcement. Article 5(2) does not
prevent authors from complying with ordinary (non-copyright-
specific) formalities (such as a court's rules of procedure). It would be
patently incongruous to read art. 5(2) as preventing the mandatory do-
ing of anything. Should authors just have to walk into a courtroom (it-
self a "formality") without having to file a statement of claim? Not
have to deal with foreign publishers and distributors because those are
"formalities"? Not have to deal with foreign tax authorities to avoid
deductions at source in a foreign country? That is clearly not the in-
tent or meaning of art. 5(2). Those are all normal acts that other copy-
right holders routinely perform to exploit their copyright works and
not-as was made abundantly clear during the adoption and revision
of the Convention-"formalities" prohibited under Art. 5(2). 86
Interestingly, in its pre-1908 incarnation, the provision was ar-
guably derogating from national treatment, though it was clearly not
intended as such. Rather, Convention drafters saw it as a simplifica-
tion of the multiple registration/deposit requirements.87 If "pure" na-
tional treatment had been applied, it would have been sufficient to
grant protection to foreign authors on the condition of accomplishing
the same formalities as nationals in every country.88 In 1908, the pro-
83. See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT, 187-189 (2001) (emphasis in
original).
84. On this point, U.S. law is compliant. Failure to make copies of a new work available
to the Library of Congress does not deprive the author of copyright protection.
85. See MIHALY FICSOR, supra note 81, at §BC-5.8.
86. For instance the Records of the 1884 Conference note that "formalities," may be tak-
en as a synonym of the term "conditions of form," included, for instance, registration, deposit,
etc.; whereas the expression "conditions," being in our view synonymous with "conditions of
substance," includes, for instance, the completion of a translation within the prescribed period.
See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, note 72 supra, at 76. In 1908 an exception to the right of repro-
duction for newspaper articles was discussed. It was contained in proposed Article 9(2) and the
relevant part read as follows: "With the exception of serial novels and short stories, any news-
paper article may be reproduced by another newspaper unless the reproduction thereof is ex-
pressly forbidden." Id. at 203 (emphasis added). It was made clear in the records that for an au-
thor to have to assert her rights (to expressly forbid) was not a prohibited formality. See id. at
191.
87. See FICSOR, supra note 81, at 42.
88. This was in fact the backdrop for the 1884 discussions. In his introductory remarks,
the French delegate Louis Renault noted: "'A second question is that of the formalities to be
complied with for the recognition of rights. Writers and artists are demanding the utmost simpli-
fication in this connection. A country recently concluded 25 conventions on literary and artistic
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vision was realigned along the principle of national treatment by mak-
ing it a provision against mandatory formalities while maintaining the
meaning of the expression "conditions and formalities" defined in
1884-1886.
The conclusion I suggest can be drawn from the above analysis
is that the two characteristics of prohibited formalities under Article
5(2) are thus that they should be (a) imposed by law and (b) copy-
right-specific.
4.Article 5(2) in Commentary
The validity of the suggested conclusion just mentioned is con-
firmed in the latest commentary on the Convention published by the
World Intellectual Property Convention (WIPO):
Formalities are any conditions or measures-independent from
those that relate to the creation of the work (such as the substantive
condition that a production must be original in order to qualify as a
protected work) or the fixation thereof (where it is a condition un-
der national law)-without the fulfillment of which the work is not
protected or loses protection. Registration, deposit of the original
or a copy, and the indication of a notice are the most typical exam-
ples.
After a detailed analysis, Professors Ricketson and Ginsburg conclude
that the prohibition contained in Article 5(2) applies, with respect to
the existence of copyright, to "everything which must be complied
with in order to ensure that the rights of the author with regard to his
work may come into existence," including a registration require-
ment. 91 They note that the addition of "exercise" to the prohibition
was meant to address the other half of the problem: "An author may
be vested with copyright, but unable to enforce her rights unless she
complies with a variety of prerequisites to suit."92 The U.S. registra-
tion requirement is specifically mentioned by Ricketson and Ginsburg
property; if its nationals have to comply 25 times with the formalities of registration and deposit,
the whole operation becomes overly intricate and costly." RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note
72, at 61.
89. See supra note 8 1.
90. FICSOR, supra note 81, at 41; See also WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK:
POLICY, LAW AND USE 262 (2d ed. 2004) ("[P]rotection is granted automatically and is not sub-
ject to the formality of registration, deposit or the like.").
91. SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND
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as a violation of Art. 5(2). 9 This explains, in their opinion, why the
requirement to register was removed by Congress for basic remedies
but not for attorneys' fees or statutory damages. 94 They note that Art.
5(2) does not prohibit the establishment of a copyright registration
system, nor to giving some legal effect to a certificate of registration,
such as prima facie evidence status.9 s The rule, as noted above, is that
neither the existence nor the exercise of copyright can be subject to
copyright-specific formalities. 96 Because a plaintiff is ordinarily ex-
pected to prove her case, it does not violate the Convention's prohibi-
tion to provide prima facie evidentiary status to a copyright registra-
tion.97
III.THE RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF THE BERNE CONVENTION
A. The Retroactive Application Rule
The Berlin Revision Conference adopted an important rule con-
cerning the application in time of the Convention. It provides the fol-
lowing principle: The Convention applies to works which "at the
moment of its coming into force, have not yet fallen into the public
domain in the country of origin through the expiry of the term of pro-
tection" but also provides that if "a work has fallen into the public
domain of the country where protection is claimed, that work shall not
be protected anew."98 Put differently, if a work has fallen into the
public domain because its term of protection expired either in the
country of origin of the work or in the country where protection is
claimed, then it need not be protected when the convention enters into
force. 9
Reading only paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 18, one could con-
clude that works that have not fallen into the public domain in their
country of origin and are not protected in the country where protec-
93. See id. at 326.
94. See Jane C. Ginsburg and John M. Kernochan, One Hundred and Two Years Later:
The U.S. Joins the Berne Convention, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 1, 13-14 (1988).
95. See RICKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 93, at 328-9.
96. See id. at 326-8.
97. That is, it is not a condition for the right to exist. See Ficsor, supra note 81, at §BC-
5.7 (noting that "[i]f registration only has the effect of a rebuttable presumption that the facts
registered are valid, it is not such a formality (unless it is applied in a way that, in spite of the
original legal regulation, it becomes a defacto formality, because, for example, courts only deal
with any infringement case if a certificate of registration is presented).").
98. See Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(1)-(2).
99. Arguably, a country would in fact be in violation of the Convention because Article
18(2) says "shall not be protected." Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(2).
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tion is claimed for a reason other than the expiration of the term of
protection previously granted should be protected, that is, removed
from the public domain and placed in the exclusive domain of the
(new) right holder(s). 100 For example, if a work was protected for the
life of the author plus 50 years (the Berne Convention minimum)'01
and a country joining the Convention has a previous term of protec-
tion of 28 years which it agreed to increase to life + 50 years, then a
work still protected in its country of origin but on which the term of
28 years had expired in the country joining the Convention would not
be protected anew.102 If, however, the work was still protected in the
country of origin and was not protected in the country joining the
Convention due to a failure to register it, then Article 18(1) and (2)
would impose an obligation to protect that work, that is, remove it
from the public domain. 0 3 This obviously interferes directly with the
interests of parties that have engaged in legitimate dealing with the
work in question prior to the application of the Convention.
In recognition of the very real hardship imposed on parties who
relied on their legitimate right to exploit an unprotected work, para-
graph 3 of Article 18 provides that the above principle "shall be sub-
ject to any provisions contained in special conventions to that effect
existing or to be concluded between countries of the Union. In the ab-
sence of such provisions, the respective countries shall determine,
each is so far as it is concerned, the conditions of application of this
principle."104
Article 18(3) seems self-explanatory: each country decides how
to apply retroactive protection. The Convention imposes no limits on
such conditions. A country joining the Berne Union may decide to
limit the protection available to reliance parties but it does not have to
do so. 05 It may impose reasonable compensation, but again it does
100. If the right holder in a work first published in France were seeking to enforce protec-
tion in a U.S. court for an infringement alleged to have taken place in the United States, then the
U.S. would be the country where protection is claimed and France would be the country of ori-
gin.
101. Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 7.
102. Article 18(4) provides that Article 18(1), (2) and (3) apply to "new accessions to the
Union," including the United States as of 1989. Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(4). The
Berne "Union" is the union of all countries party to the Convention. Berne Convention, supra
note 1, art. 1.
103. See FIcsoR, supra note 81, at §§BC-18.6 - 18.7.
104. Beme Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(3).
105. According to one view, the term "transitional" indicates that the protection of reliance
parties must be temporary in nature. See FICSOR, supra note 81, at §BC-18.11. However, as is
noted below, proposals to impose a specific time-frame (two years) were rejected.
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not have to do so.106 . The question is whether the proper metaphor
here is that a country limiting the protection available to reliance par-
ties is passing the exam with an "A" instead of a passing grade or
whether it is a policy plane overshooting its runway. The Convention
hints strongly that not restoring protection on works on which protec-
tion has expired ("shall not be protected anew")'o7 is sometimes de-
sirable.'os This is reinforced by Article 7 of the Convention, which
contains the rule known a "comparison of the terms of protection,"
according to which a Berne Union member country does not have to
extend protection to a work no longer protected in its country of ori-
gin, for example if the country of origin has a shorter term of protec-
tion.109
It is a cardinal principle of copyright law that people can use the
public domain at will.1 o This allows the copyright cycle to continue,
thus making copyright "the engine of free expression."", Pulling
works out of the public domain goes against this principle, which the
Convention itself recognizes, and must thus be considered with ut-
most caution.l12
The debate about the proper interpretation of Article 18(3) boils
down to this question: Should Article 18(3) be interpreted narrowly-
and force Berne Union members limit the protection of reliance par-
ties as much as possible-because Article 18 establishes the principle
that existing works should be protected at the time of entry into force
106. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)(3)(A) (2006).
107. Berme Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(2).
108. As a basic policy matter, it seems rather odd that a foreign author who registered but
whose work is no longer protected because term has expired has no right to seek restoration
while an author who failed to comply with formalities would somehow automatically be entitled
to restoration.
109. Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(8). The text of the Article also reads as a clear
limitation: "the term shall not exceed the term fixed in the country of origin." Id. (emphasis add-
ed).
110. See HOwARD A. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT §1.3 (2009) (noting that "While
Congress has a broad scope for its discretion, the basic mechanism is constitutionally fixed as
the dedication of the work to the public domain upon the expiration of federal statutory protec-
tion. If Congress strikes a desirable balance between the interests of authors, publishers, and the
public, in the exclusive rights it grants to copyright owners, the copyright system should 'pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.' Thus the copyright system provides a benefit to
society that justifies the necessary evils of monopoly pricing and constraints on the use of
present works for the creation of newer works.").
Ill. Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2007) (citing Harper & Row Pub-
lishers Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985)).
112. See Thomas Gordon Kennedy, GATT- Out of the Public Domain: Constitutional Di-
mensions of Foreign Copyright Restoration, II ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 545, 578
(1996).
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of the Convention?113 In trying to identify the right answer one may
note, first, that this flies in the face of a core principle of international
law, namely, that States can do all that is not prohibited.1 4 In fact,
Article 18(3) specifically provides that States can decide which condi-
tions to impose on restoration. Additionally, Article 18(2) imposes a
limit on restoration of protection for works which are in the public
domain of the country of protection is claimed because a previously
granted term of protection has expired. Therefore, the Convention
should be read as imposing limited restoration and the allowing States
to impose their own conditions on such limited restoration.
B.Negotiating history ofArticle 18
To identify the proper interpretation of Article 18, we can also
turn to the negotiating history. This is specifically allowed under Ar-
ticle 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.15
1.The 1886 and 1896 texts
Article 18 was modified twice. The corresponding provision in
the original 1866 text of the Convention read as follows: "Under the
reserves and conditions to be determined by common agreement, this
Convention shall apply to all works which at the moment of its com-
ing into force have not yet fallen into the public domain in the country
of origin."ll 6 The extent of the obligation was thus left to be defined
in a separate "common agreement."'i 7 That agreement is contained in
the Final Protocol of September 9, 1886 (adopted in the same date as
the original text of the Convention). Paragraph 4 of the Protocol read
as follows:
[1] The common agreement provided for in Article 14 of the Con-
vention is established as follows: [2] The application of the Con-
vention to works which have not fallen into the public domain at
the time when it comes into force shall take effect according to the
relevant provisions contained in special conventions existing, or to
be concluded, to that effect. [3] In the absence of such provisions
113. See supra note 103.
114. See S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9, at 31 (Sept. 7) (holding
that, in the absence of a prohibitory rule of international law, Turkey could prosecute the captain
of a French ship that had collided with, and harmed persons on, a Turkish ship on the high seas).
115. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
116. Berne Convention (1866), art. 14, CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 228. ). All original
texts were in the French language. The translations used in this brief are all from the aforemen-
tioned book published by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).
117. See id.
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between any countries of the Union, the respective countries shall
regulate, each in so far as it is concerned, by its domestic legisla-
tion, the manner in which the principle contained in Article 14 is to
be applied. 18
The Final Protocol thus only established a general principle leaving it
up to each country to decide how it should be applied. The Records of
the 1885 Diplomatic Conference where the text of Article 14 was
agreed upon are also very clear: "As noted below, in connection with
the Final Protocol, the implementation of the above Article [14] will
be left to each country of the Union, which will decide on the condi-
tions of retroactivity according to its own laws or specific conven-
tions."ll9
The 1896 Additional Act of the Convention modified Paragraph
4 of the Final Protocol to make it applicable to translations and to
"new accessions to the Union."1 20
2.The 1908 (Berlin) text
At the 1908 Berlin Conference, Article 14 became Article 18 and
the provisions of the Final Protocol of 1886, as amended in Paris in
1896, were incorporated into a single Article.12 ' Because Article 18
essentially took its final form at that Conference, the discussion on
retroactive application at that Conference is illuminating. The Report
of that Conference reads in part as follows: "Account had to be taken
of the de facto situation existing in certain countries at the time the
Convention came into force, of the interests of those who might have
lawfully reproduced or performed foreign works without their au-
thors' authorization."1 2 2 There was thus a clear acknowledgement of
legitimate interests existing at the time of application of the Conven-
tion.
One interesting difference between the 1886 version and the
(current) version adopted in 1908 is that, while the former allowed
countries to "regulate, each in so far as it is concerned, by its domestic
legislation, the manner in which the principle contained in Article 14
is to be applied," the latter allows countries to "determine, each in so
far as it is concerned, the conditions of application" of the principle of
118. Id.
119. Id. at 123.
120. Berne Convention, Additional Act and Interpretative Declaration of Paris of May 4,
1896, CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 228.
121. See RIcKETSON & GINSBURG, supra note 91, at 215-216.
122. CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 158.
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restoration. 123
The current text is thus not limited to regulation by legislation. A
court could determine appropriate conditions, for example. The WIPO
Guide to the Berne Convention specifically notes that "it is a matter
therefore for each member country to decide on the limits of this ret-
roactivity and, in litigation, for the courts to take into account these
acquired rights [of reliance parties]."1 2 4
3.Application of time of more recent instruments
The application in time provision of the 1996 WIPO Copyright
Treaty mirrors Article 18 of the Berne Convention (1971).125 The Re-
cords of the Diplomatic Conference, at which that treaty was adopted,
contain the following statement from the Conference Chairman, dis-
cussing possible options for a provision on application in time:
He [Chairman] believed that that meant that there would be no ret-
roactive effect concerning prior acts and the provisions of the
Treaty would not introduce an obligation to countries to change
their laws in such a way that prior agreements would be changed.
He felt that that was in most countries probably already constitu-
tionally prohibited ... He acknowledged that revival of rights in
some cases would cause practical problems. 126
The World Trade Organization Agreement (WTO) on Trade-related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rightsl 27 is also relevant in this con-
text. It could be considered a "special convention" under Article 18(3)
if it restricted the United States ability to determine appropriate condi-
tions of retroactive protection.128 However, that Agreement provides
that "copyright obligations with respect to existing works shall be
solely determined under Article 18 of the Berne Convention
(1971).l129 As such, it does not modify the obligations contained in
123. Berne Convention (1886), Final Protocol of September 9, 1886, art. 3, supra note 32.
Berne Convention (1971) supra note 1 (emphasis added).
124. GUIDE, at 186 (emphasis added).
125. World Intellectual Property Organization: Copyright Treaty art. 13, Dec. 20, 1996, 36
1.L.M. 65; see also World Intellectual Property Organization: Performances and Phonograms
Treaty art. 22, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 76.
126. World Intellectual Property Organization, Records of the Diplomatic Conference on
Certain Copyright and Neighboring Rights Questions, Geneva 1996, Vol. II, 727 (1999) (em-
phasis added).
127. TRIPS, supra note 14. This Agreement was implemented by the Uruguay Round
Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809 (codified at 19 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3624
(1994)).
128. See MtHALY FICSOR at §BC-18.10.
129. TRIPS, supra note 14, art. 70.2.
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Article 18. The TRIPS Agreement is nonetheless relevant because it
is subject to the dispute settlement mechanism of the WTO. It is a
long-standing principle of WTO law that WTO Agreements should
not be interpreted to include concessions not explicitly bargained for.
130 Essentially, trade agreements are bargained for and should not,
therefore, be "completed" or amended by interpretation.13 ' In addi-
tion, in interpreting the Berne Convention provisions incorporated
into the TRIPS Agreement, dispute settlement panels referred to the
negotiating history of that Convention.1 32 Consequently, because ef-
forts were made during the negotiations to cabin Article 18, for ex-
ample by limiting measures to a two-year window or, as happened at
the Paris Conference of 1896, to simply delete it,133 and because those
efforts failed and no clear statement restricting the scope of Article
18(3) is contained in the Convention records, a panel is unlikely to
"read" significant restrictions into Article 18(3) of the Berne Conven-
tion as incorporated into the TRIPS Agreement. 134
4.Suggested interpretation
The history of Article 18 shows an undeniable awareness of
problems caused by the application of the Convention to works in ex-
istence at the time of its first application in a country joining the Un-
ion, and what seems to be an unlimited discretion of Berne Union
130. For example, in Brazil - Export Financing Programme For Aircraft, in discussing an
exception invoked by Brazil, the panel noted: "nothing indicates that the failure to remove this
clause was something that developing countries bargained for." Panel Report, Brazil - Export
Financing Programme for Aircraft, 43, n.140, WT/DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999). By contrast, in this
case, the failure to remove the exception was clearly intended.
131. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION: CONSTITUTION AND
JURISPRUDENCE, 91-92 (1998)
132. Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, paras. 6.45-
6.47, WT/DS I 60/R (June 15, 2000).
133. That is, its equivalent provision at the time, namely the Beme Convention for the Pro-
tection of Literary and Artistic Works, Final Protocol, para. 4, Sept. 9, 1886.
134. Many dispute-settlement panels have had to interpret conventions, including the
Berne Convention, which were incorporated by reference into the TRIPS Agreement (in the case
of Berne, by TRIPS art. 9.2). Those panels have paid considerable attention to the negotiating
history of Berne and one went as far as to say that "in the absence of any express exclusion in
Article 9.1 of the TRIPS Agreement, the incorporation of Articles II and I Ibis of the Berne
Convention (1971) into the Agreement includes the entire acquis of these provisions . . . . One
should avoid interpreting the TRIPS Agreement to mean something different than the Berne
Convention except where this is explicitly provided for. This principle is in conformity with the
public international law presumption against conflicts, which has been applied by WTO panels
and the Appellate Body in a number of cases."
Panel Report, United States - Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, paras. 6.63, 6.66,
WTIDSI60/R (June 15, 2000).
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members to determine the conditions of application of retroactivity.
The Convention does not favour a maximum term of protection in all
cases. It specifically imposes a rule of comparison of terms of protec-
tion and a prohibition on restoration of copyright for works that have
fallen in the public domain in the country where protection is claimed
through the expiration of a previously granted term of protection. 135 A
country complies with Article 18 if it chooses any degree of protec-
tion of works existing at the time of entry into force.13 6 The only inva-
lid option is a complete denial of the principle of retroactive applica-
tion. This means, conversely, that a vast amount of discretion may be
used to determine the protection of reliance parties.
C.Article 18 in Commentary
I consider it useful to look at learned commentaries on Article 18
to determine the validity of the above suggested interpretation of Ar-
ticle 18.
Professor Paul Goldstein of Stanford law School seems to hit the
right note when he states that "Article 18(3) of the Beme Convention
gives member countries considerable leeway to meliorate any preju-
dice suffered by users when a work they correctly believed was in the
public domain is restored to copyright."1 3 7
A number of other commentators offer insights into the interpre-
tation of Article 18.
1.Briggs
One of the earliest detailed commentaries published in English
on the Berne Convention was William Briggs' book entitled The Law
of International Copyright. 38 The discussion in the book, which was
published prior to the 1908 Revision of the Convention, is based on
the original text (1886). He notes:
These qualifications [in the Final Protocol] proceeded from a de-
sire to safeguard vested interests. In the absence of international
protection foreign works had at one time been universally looked
upon as lawful objects for native reproduction, either in their origi-
nal form, or by adaptation or translation. Capital had been sunk,
135. Berne Convention, supra note 1, art. 7(8) and 18(2), respectively.
136. A complete denial means that the principles contained in Article 18(1) and 2) are not
applied. See MnILY FICSOR, supra note 81, §§ BC-1.9 and 18.10.
137. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND PRACTICE
245 (2001).
138. BRIGGS, supra note 55.
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labour had been employed in making these valuable reproductions;
lawful interests had been thereby created, and a quasi-property had
thus been acquired. A State which had tolerated the indiscriminate
reproduction of foreign works would hardly be justified in giving
an unqualified consent to the principle of retroactivity, without
making due provision for the securing of this quasi-property.
Hence the rule of Art. 14 was not made absolute, and it was left to
each country to regulate by particular agreement or by domestic
law the mode in which it should be applied.139
Briggs also noted that when the United Kingdom implemented
the original text of the Convention,14 0 the implementing legislation
provided that "nothing in this section [of the International Copyright
Act of 1886] shall diminish or prejudice any rights or interests arising
from or in connection with [the production of any work in the United
Kingdom prior to the entry into force of the Act] which are subsisting
and valuable."' 4 ' He refers to a case in which the court would have
been prepared to let a reliance parties produce fresh copies of a work
even after the application of the act if "he had not himself recouped
for his outlay." 42
2.Karp Study
A complete study of the application of Article 18 in the United
States was prepared by Irwin Karp.143 He noted, first, that because
most European countries adhered to the Convention in the late 1 9 th or
early 20t century, the issue of retroactive protection has all but disap-
peared from policy radars in those jurisdictions.'" In addition, very
few of them had registration systems.14 5 Then, citing the opinion of
"many United States and most foreign copyright experts," Karp con-
cluded that while the United States had "considerable leeway in fash-
139. Id. at 265. Briggs also notes that a proposal by Belgium and France to remove the
flexibility contained in the Final Protocol at the 1896 Revision Conference was defeated. Id. at
266.
140. The UK was one of the first Berne member countries. It joined as of December 5,
1887. See WIPO - Administered Treaties,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?treaty-id=15 (last visited Feb. 6, 2010).
141. BRIGGS, supra note 55, at 268.
142. Id. at 268-69. The case is Hanfstaengl v. Holloway, (1893), 2 Q.B. I (Eng.). It was
mentioned at the first Conference (1884) that the protection of reliance parties that a country
could impose was not limited to copies in existence at the time of application of the Convention
but extended to copies "in the process of being completed." CENTENARY, supra note 1, at 92.
143. Irwin Karp, Final Report, Article 18 Study on Retroactive United States Copyright
Protection for Berne and Other Works, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L.& ARTS 157 (1996).
144. Id. at 167.
145. See id.
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ioning the conditions of retroactivity," it did not have enough leeway
to "deny any degree of retroactivity," because then the principle is not
applied at all.14 6 Conversely, any set of conditions beyond complete
absence would be "conditions" on the application of the principle.147
Additionally, the fact that there is no express limitation on the flexi-
bility contained in Article 18(3) of the Convention supports the view
that an international dispute-settlement body would be unlikely to
read into Article 18(3) limitations that it does not expressly contain.
3.Bogsch Study
Former WIPO Director General Arpad Bogsch published his
views on Article 18 during the debates on the United States accession
to the Berne Convention.14 8 In this letter to the Commissioner of Pat-
ents and Trademarks, Dr. Bogsch notes, in agreement with the above,
that the "principle" referred to Article 18(3) is the one described in
Articles 18(1) and (2).149 He argues that while a country can impose
conditions on the application of the principle, the principle must be
applied in some way, thus negating the possibility of a complete ab-
sence of retroactivity.' 50 He also argues that Article 18(3) only allows
transitional measures and cites a comment to that effect in the negoti-
ating history. '
Even if one accepts this postulate, Article 18(3) conditions are
by definition transitional in that their purpose is to ensure the transi-
tion from non-Berne status to Berne status.152 Transitional does not
necessarily mean short-lived. In fact, Dr. Bogsch quotes a diplomatic
conference record showing that a proposal that would have limited the
power of a country joining the Berne Union to decide within two
years whether to impose conditions and then which measures to take
146. Id. at 172.
147. See MIHALY FICSOR supra note 81.
148. Arpad Bogsch, WIPO Views ofArticle 18, 43 J. COPYRIGHT Soc.'Y U.S.A. 181, 181
(1995).
149. See id. at 190.
150. See id.
151. Id.
152. A "transition" as defined in the Websters Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary of the
English Language is a "passing from one condition, form, stage, activity, place, etc. to another."
McKENCHIE ET AL., WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1939 (1979).
Even if not limited in time by the restoration statute, it will not be permanent-that is, it will be
"temporary"--because it applies to works used by reliance parties at the time of entry into force
which either they will stop using or will (in their restored capacity) fall into the public domain,
which then makes the transition protection unnecessary.
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was rejected.153 Still, without any direct authority to support this
view, Dr Bogsch refers to a "quite general agreement" that measures
taken under Article 18(3) should not be applied for a period of more
than two years.154 I found no authority to support this conclusion. In
fact, the only precedent mentioned in that connection in Dr Bogsch's
letter is Art. 13(2) of the Berne Convention (1971) which specifically
mentions a two-year window and a proposal to enshrine a two-year
window in the Convention was expressly rejected.' 55 Additionally,
Article 13(2) works against the point made by Dr Bogsch: if Conven-
tion negotiators specifically thought of mentioning the two-year pe-
riod in Article 13(2), why not in Article 18(3)?16 In fact, as noted
above, negotiators had the option before them and decided not to take
it.'57 I conclude that while the two-year window may well be a valid
implementation of Article 18, that term of protection of reliance par-
ties is not mandated by the article or its negotiating history.
D.Application in the United States
The United States has worked hard of late to become the interna-
tional copyright valedictorian, even though it was considered a pirate
nation by many Berne Union members as late as 1914 when a special
retaliatory protocol was adopted by the Union to allow them to deny
protection to works of U.S. authors even if first published in a Berne
country. 158 It could have applied a very limited form of retroactive
protection, thus avoiding any trampling of the rights of third ("reli-
153. Arpad Bogsch, WIPO Views ofArticle 18, 43 J. COPYRIGHT Soc.'Y U.S.A 181, 191
(1995).
154. Id. at 192.
155. At the 1896 Conference, the Records are quite clear, though normatively there was
support for the two-year proposal:
To this end it had been proposed stating that 'countries which have not taken
measures within a period of two years will be deemed to have purely and simply
accepted the principle of retroactivity.' ... Nevertheless, doubts arose. It was
feared that a fixed time limit might be considered awkward and might dissuade
certain States, whose accession to the Union was considered particularly desira-
ble, from doing so. The vast majority of the Committee did not share these fears;
however, it did not want to carry on regardless and not take account of the
scruples of one of its members.
Id. at 191.
156. Beme Convention (1971), supra note 1, at art.13(2)("Recordings of musical works
made in a country of the Union in accordance with Article 13(3) of the Conventions signed at
Rome on June 2, 1928, and at Brussels on June 26, 1948, may be reproduced in that country
without the permission of the author of the musical work until a date two years after that country
becomes bound by this Act.").
157. BOGSCH, supra note 152, at 191.
158. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
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ance") parties-in fact the U.S. did so by not providing for retroactive
application when it initially joined Berne.' 59 However, Congress
quickly changed tracks and opted, first, for restoration of Canadian
and Mexican copyrights by adopting section 104A of the Copyright
Act. 160 It then decided approximately a year later to severely restrict
the rights of reliance parties by extending retroactive protection to all
Berne works.' 6'
The United States Congress recognized this degree of flexibility
when it joined Berne.16 2 The record shows that some in Congress had
noted the "sweeping discretion" contained in Article 18(3), even
wondering whether there was any form obligation in Article 18 (be-
yond a statement of principle) to restore protection. 163 Indeed, the re-
cord shows that Article 18 was not the culprit. Nor was the Constitu-
tion used as a guiding light.'6 The United States reconsidered its
stance on retroactive protection ostensibly because it wanted to ad-
dress trade concerns and obtain retroactive protection of U.S. works
from certain trading partners. 6 5
CONCLUSION
The international contextualization of the adoption of the 1909
Act sheds a different light both on the exceptionalism prevalent in the
U.S. Congress and on the views of major trading partners of the
United States.
After 1908, the degree of parallelism between the Convention
and United States law increased. The same rights were added, for-
malities were reduced and the application in time of the Berne Con-
vention was applied much more strictly than required under the Con-
159. Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853,
2860 (1988).
160. In Application of the North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., ch.
17, Oct. 7, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 296, 670.
161. See Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No. 103-465, 108 Stat. 4809, 4976
(1994).
162. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, supra note 166 (The "sweeping discretion" contained in Ar-
ticle 18(3) was noted and members wondered whether there was any form obligation in Article
18 (beyond a statement of principle) to restore protection).
163. H.R. REP. No. 100-609, pt. 5F, at 51-52 (1987).
164. KARP, supra note 147, at 172 ("Congress paid little, if any, attention, to the Constitu-
tional issues under the First and Fifth Amendment and the Copyright Clause.").
165. See id.; see also General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GA 77): Intellectual Prop-
erty Provisions: J Hearing on HR. 4894 and S. 2368 Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual
Property and Judicial Administration of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on
Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 246-52
(1994).
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vention rules. However, the lax protection of foreign works applied
until the 1980s and the quick transition to a maximalist approach were
not caused by perceived obligations under Berne. The realpolitik cata-
lyst was the linkage between trade and intellectual property, and the
perceived comparative advantage of the United States in generating
and protecting as much as possible valuable innovation and creativity
in the form of intellectual property rights. 166
166. This had profound impacts on the political importance of intellectual property protec-
tion and the adoption of stringent legislation, including extremely high statutory damages (see
17 U.S.C. §504(c)) and publicly funded enforcement (see Prioritizing Resources and Organiza-
tion for Intellectual Property Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-403, 122 Stat. 4256). But it also af-
fects the nature of the rights concerned by moving them away from a propertization narrative
(see generally WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT Wars (Oxford Univ.
Press 2009)) and towards a regime under which infringement rules are tied to actual damages.
See Daniel Gervais, (Re)implementing the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights to Foster Innovation, 12: 5, J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 348, 350-51 (2009).
